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COMMODITY EXCHANGES: THE CASE FOR
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
Under the Commodity Exchange Act,' the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC)2 possesses considerable supervisory authority3 over the rules
and actions of commodity exchanges. 4 Historically, commodity exchanges have
been self-regulatinf. 5 Self-regulation continues as the foundation of the Commodity Exchange Act. Self-regulation, however, may lead to abuses. Where the regulated and the regulators are one and the same,7 the regulators may establish self1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
The CFTC was established in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, [hereinafter cited as CFTC Act], which amended the Commodity Exchange
Act, supra note 1.
Congress substantially increased federal agency authority in the CFTC Act of 1974, supra note 2.
There are presently eleven major commodity exchanges in the United States: Chicago Board of Trade,
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Rice and Cotton Exchange, Commodity Exchange Inc., Kansas City Board of Trade, Mid-America Commodity Exchange, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, New
York Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange, New York Cotton Exchange, New York Futures Exchange,
New York Mercantile Exchange.
The CFTC approved the creation of the National Futures Association (NFA) as a registered futures associations in 1980. Registered futures associations are established pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 21
(1982). The NFA is essentially to the commodity futures industry what the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) is to the securities industry. Both of these registered associations are selfregulatory in nature. Because the NFA is a "self-regulatory" organization, for purposes of this note it
will be included when using the term "commodity exchanges" unless otherwise specified.
The first commodity exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, was established around 1850 as the central market for agricultural products, approximately 75 years before the enactment of any federal
legislation to regulate the industry. Johnson, Self-Regulation: A Primeron the Perils, 27 AD. L. REV.
387, 388 (1975). Two possible reasons exist for the evolution of self-regulatory structures in the commodity exchanges: (1) the markets were centrally-located relative to most participants and (2) the
commodity markets were "extremely sensitive to the ebb and flow of public confidence and prohibited
activities that would destroy public confidence." Id. at 388. See also House Comm. on Agriculture,
Report on H.R. 13113, H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
House Report]; I P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION 346-47.
Another commentator has stated two advantages to a self-regulatory scheme. First, the members
of the regulated industry largely underwrite the cost of regulation. Second, because the regulated are
the regulators, self-regulation may be "more sensitive to the true regulatory needs" of the industry
than total government regulation. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions For An Accommodation, 62 N.C.L. REV. 475, 475
(1984).
The rules and regulations of most commodity exchanges are still much more comprehensive than the
Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations. I P. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 347.
In the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Congress recognized the continued importance of self-regulation in the overall CFTC regulatory scheme.
The Committee bill does not propose that self-regulatory activities of the exchanges be abolished in favor of continued and direct federal regulation of all aspects of futures trading. However, self-regulation cannot be viewed in this and later decades as an argument against greater
Federal regulation. Self-regulation is a commendable and noble concept and useful in such a
complex atmosphere as that which surrounds futures trading. It cannot continue to function
without a strong Federal regulatory umbrella over self-regulatory activities of the industry.
Self-regulation cannot be permitted to be a barrier against public policy and the interests of the
American public. Yet, with proper Federal supervisory authority, needed self-regulatory efforts of the exchanges can live a useful life into the 21st Century and, hopefully, beyond.
House Report, supra note 5, at 48. The objective of the CFTC Act was to improve the quality of selfregulation and federal oversight rather than to diminish the role of exchange self-regulation. I P.
JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 347.
The members of the exchanges promulgate the rules by which they and all members are to abide.
When this note discusses commodity exchange self-regulation as it presently exists, it refers to a
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serving, anticompetitive rules.8 Antitrust laws may correct some of these abuses.
Full application of the antitrust laws to commodity exchange rules, however, may
sometimes frustrate the self-regulatory objectives of the Commodity Exchange
Act.

Self-regulation requires some anticompetitive rules and actions. 9 When the
procompetitive antitrust laws and CFTC regulations conflict, however, the antitrust laws should yield. Anticompetitive rules and actions of the Commodity Exchange Act must be immune from antitrust laws if they are necessary to further
the objectives of the Act. The United States Supreme Court has implied immunity from antitrust laws for securities exchange rules and actions which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) directly oversees or which are necessary to
make the Securities Exchange Act work, l° as well as rules which the Securities
Exchange Act affirmatively requires."
This note contends that the courts should imply an immunity from antitrust
laws for the commodity exchange rules and actions similar to the immunity they
imply in securities exchange cases. This note will review the few court decisions
that address the issue whether the commodity exchange rules and actions which
the CFTC may review are immune from the antitrust laws. It then analyzes the
rationale and extent of the implied antitrust immunity as applied to the securities
exchange rules and actions. After discussing the nature and scope of CFTC oversight of commodity exchange rules and actions, this note will compare the applicable provisions of the SEC and CFTC regulatory schemes. Finally, it explores
the scope of the antitrust immunity the courts should imply.
Few courts have addressed the issue of implied antitrust immunity for commodity exchange rules and actions. 2 Most of the recent lower court decisions
have merely addressed the issue of whether Congress intended the preemption of
scheme of primary self-regulation by the exchanges with direct regulatory oversight by the CFTC, a
federal regulatory agency.
8.
"Self-regulatory organizations may be less interested in regulation designed to protect the general
public than in regulation crafted to restrict competition and reinforce the dominance of the powerful
members of the regulated group." Smythe, supra note 5, at 476. See also Asch, The Antitrust Laws
and the Regulated Securities Markets, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 209, 210 (1966); Cary, Self-Regulation in
the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244 (1963).
9.
For example, under the Commodity Exchange Act, futures trading is limited to CFTC approved commodity exchange members. See infra notes 109 to 110 and accompanying text. The exchanges have
rules which limit their total memberships, resulting in a barrier to entry in the commodity futures
industry.
10. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341
(1963). The scope of the implied antitrust immunity for the securities exchanges is discussed infra at
notes 40 to 89 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has also addressed this issue with regard to the National Association of Securities Dealers, which is subject to SEC review. See United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers,
422 U.S. 694 (1975). Because the SEC's power to review the rules of both securities exchanges' and
securities dealers' associations is equivalent, the NASD decision should also have an impact on the
scope of immunity from antitrust laws for securities exchanges. See infra notes 70 to 89 and accompanying text.
11. See United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975), discussed infra at notes
70 to 89 and acompanying text.
12. Prior to the CFTC Act, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of an antitrust immunity for the
commodity exchanges in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973), and Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973). In Ricci, the petitioner, a member of the exchange,
alleged that the exchange and others conspired to restrain his business by transferring his exchange
membership to another without notice or hearing. He also alleged violations of the exchange's rules
and the Commodity Exchange Act.
In Ricci, the Court referred to Silver v. New York Stock Exchange and stated that it was presented
with the "different case" discussed in Silver. See infra note 53. Although the Court did not imply an
antitrust immunity, it applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and stayed the antitrust action until
the Commodity Exchange Authority could hold proceedings on the Exchange's actions. "[G]iven
administrative authority to examine the Ricci-Exchange dispute in the light of the regulatory scheme
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the application of the antitrust laws to activities for which there exists a private
right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act.' 3 These decisions, however,
are unrelated to the issues of whether, and to what extent, the courts should imply
antitrust immunity for commodity exchange rules and actions. 4
Although few decisions discuss the existence of an implied antitrust immunity
for commodity exchange rules and actions which the CFTC reviews,' 5 the decisions support the existence of an immunity similar to the one enjoyed by securities
exchanges. For example, in Jordon v. New York MercantileExchange,'6 the plaintiff alleged that defendant commodity exchange's failure to amend its allegedly
defective futures contract rules violated the antitrust laws." The district court,
relying upon two Supreme Court decisions regarding the application of antitrust
laws to SEC regulations,1 8 stated that even if the futures contract rules were anticompetitive on their face, the rules were immune from the antitrust laws."

13.

14.

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

and Exchange rules, the antitrust action should be stayed until the administrative officials have had
opportunity to act." 409 U.S. at 302.
One commentator has stated that had the Commodity Exchange Authority possessed direct oversight of the specific challenged conduct or the duty to apply the "least anticompetitive means," the
Supreme Court would have implied an antitrust immunity for the challenged exchange conduct.
Johnson, Antitrust in the Commodities Field: After Gordon, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 119 (1977).
Goldschmidt v. Hunt, 556 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Pollock v. Citrus Assocs., 512 F. Supp. 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Strax v. Commodity Exch., 524 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Smith v. Groover,
468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
In Pollock, Goldschmidt, and Strax, the courts held that the existence of private causes of action
under the Commodity Exchange Act does not preempt antitrust claims. The courts relied on two
factors: first, the House Agriculture Committee deleted a provision of an earlier version of the CFTC
bill which would have provided for an express exemption from the antitrust laws (the courts interpreted this as illustrative of congressional intent to ensure that the antitrust laws were not preempted);
second, the courts relied upon the testimony of Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, who stated: "In brief, in successive years, wheat, soybeans, and corn have been subjected
to anticompetitive and monopolistic practices in commodity markets and have significantly contributed to food prices charged consumers. These developments indicate the urgency of applying antitrust
principles to the commodity markets unequivocally.
...
Pollock v. Citrus Assocs., 512 F. Supp. at
717 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Hearings on S.2485, S.2587, S.2837 and
H.R. 13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1974)).
The court also stated that Congressman Rodino's testimony helped bring about the inclusion in
§ 201(b) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act. § 201(b) states: "Nothing in this Section [the entire CEA] shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on the courts of the United
States or any State." CFTC Act, supra note 2, at 1395. (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1972)).
The court in Smith v. Groover, however, reached the opposite result and held that the plaintiffs
were preempted from pursuing antitrust remedies where the CEA provided a private right of action.
The court stated: "Since plaintiffs have a private right of action under the CEA, their antitrust claims
• . .are 'superfluous.' The specific statutory prohibitions contained in the CEA, as amended, must
prevail over the general prohibitions of the Sherman Act." 468 F. Supp. at 116. The court acknowledged, however, that "the drafters of the CFTCA intended to leave the antitrust laws intact." Id.
The issue of exclusive remedies is distinct from that of an implied antitrust immunity for exchange
rules and actions where there is direct agency review. This note does not argue that the existence of a
cause of action under the Commodity Exchange Act entirely preempts antitrust laws; rather, it urges
courts to imply an antitrust immunity for commodity exchange rules and actions which the CFTC
directly reviews and which are necessary to make the CFTC regulatory work, or where the statutes
expressly authorize anticompetitive acts.
Jordon v. New York Mercantile Exch., 571 F. Supp. 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on othergroundssub
nofa.
Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1984); Seligson v.
New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affid sub nom. Miller v. New York
Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
571 F. Supp. 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub noma.
Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. New
York Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1984).
571 F. Supp. at 1535-36.
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975), and United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
"In any event, given the CFTC's extensive authority to approve, alter, and supplement contract
rules, such rules are not subject to antitrust challenge."
571 F. Supp. at 1562.
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In Seligson v. New York Produce Exchange,2" decided prior to the enactment
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,21 the court followed
an implied antitrust immunity approach similar to that applied to securities exchanges. The plaintiff, a trustee in bankruptcy of an exchange member-broker,
alleged, inter alia, that the defendant exchange violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act 22 by failing to run an orderly contract market and failing to relieve the threat
of extreme market concentration in cottonseed oil futures.23 The court, however,
reasoned that an implied immunity from the antitrust laws for commodity exchanges must exist in order to prevent the frustration of the regulatory goals of
the Commodity Exchange Act. The court also applied the limiting principle
espoused by the United States Supreme Court in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange25 regarding the scope
of the implied antitrust immunity for securities ex2
change rules and actions. ?
At the least, Jordon and Seligson demonstrate that some courts are willing to
apply the implied antitrust immunity approach created for securities exchange
rules and actions to commodity exchange rules and actions. The commodity exchange and securities exchange regulatory schemes are similar in that both
schemes are based on self-regulation 27 and both of the self-regulatory rules of
these industries are subject to similar federal agency review. 28 Since the frustration of the goals of the regulatory scheme for commodity exchanges is as harmful
as the frustration of the objectives of securities exchange regulation, the courts
should apply to commodity exchanges the same approach applied to securities
exchanges. 29
IMPLIED ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR SECURITIES EXCHANGE
RULES AND ACTIONS
Securities exchanges currently enjoy a broad implied immunity from the antitrust laws3 ° for rules and actions over which the SEC has supervisory authority. 31
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.

378 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd sub nom. Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F. 2d 762
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
See supra note 2.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
in restraint of trade. The plaintiff alleged that both acts of price-fixing and other acts restraining trade
were committed. 378 F. Supp. at 1083.
378 F. Supp. at 1083.
Id. at 1107. "The entire regulatory scheme administered by the Exchange would constitute a restraint
of trade and violation of the Sherman Act were it not for the limited immunity to antitrust challenge
necessary to effectuate an otherwise contradictory congressional act." Id.
373 U.S. 341 (1963). See infra text accompanying note 46.
"[T]he Exchange's actions would not be immune to antitrust attack at this stage of the litigation unless
it were established beyond dispute that those actions did not go beyond what was necessary to further
the regulatory scheme of the Act." 378 F. Supp. at 1104.
See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text and infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
Although the overall regulatory schemes of the securities industry and the commodities industry differ
greatly in many respects, the SEC and the CFTC possess similar authority to oversee rules and regulations promulgated and enforcement actions brought by exchanges in the respective industries. See
infra notes 101-125 and acompanying text.
Two commentators have reached similar conclusions. Johnson, supra note 12; Special Committee on
Commodities Regulation, Antitrust Immunity Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 35 REC. A. B.
C-TY N.Y. 233 (1980).
For an excellent discussion of the antitrust immunity for securities exchanges, see Linden, A Reconciliation of Antitrust Law With Securities Regulation: The Judicial Approach, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
179 (1977); Smythe, supra note 5.
The SEC has uniform supervisory authority over self-regulatory organizations which include national
securities exchanges, national securities dealers associations, national clearing agencies, and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1982). For purposes of this note, the
SEC's authority will be referred to in terms of the SEC's authority over the securities exchanges.
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Because of the similarities between SEC regulation of the securities exchanges and
CFTC regulation of the commodity exchanges,3 2 it is helpful to explore both the
rationale behind and the scope of the immunity for the securities exchanges when
considering the applicability of such an immunity to the commodity exchanges.
Courts imply antitrust immunity to securities exchange rules and actions for
two reasons. First, the securities exchanges have traditionally3 3 been self-regulatory organizations 4 although it is true that after the Stock Market Crash of 1929,
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act to provide for at least some government regulation of the securities exchanges and their members.3 5 Second, an implied antitrust immunity promotes consistency between the SEC regulatory
scheme and the antitrust laws.36 The anticompetitive characteristics of exchange
self-regulation and SEC oversight, and the procompetitive objectives of the federal
antitrust laws, can often be fulfilled without displacement of any part of either
scheme.3 7 At times, however, a direct conflict arises between these schemes.38 In
such instances, the procompetitive goals of the antitrust laws must yield to exchange self-regulation to ensure that the regulatory scheme contemplated by Congress in the Securities Exchange Act is not frustrated.39
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issues of the existence
and extent of the securities exchanges' implied immunity from antitrust laws in
32. See infra notes 97 to 126 and accompanying text.
33. The first securities exchange was established in Philadelphia in 1790. Smythe, supra note 5, at 480.
The New York Stock Exchange was established in 1792. SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities
Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 295 (1963). The exchanges provided the only
regulation of the securities industry until 1934 and, until that time, were treated as nonregulated
private clubs not subject to antitrust scrutiny. Note, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange: Minimum
Commission or Free Competition?, 18 STAN. L. REV., 213, 222-23 (1965); Comment, An Approachfor
Reconciling Antitrust Law and Securities Law. the Antitrust Immunity of the Securities Industry Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 260, 266 (1970).
34. "Self-regulation is a concept more widely cited and relied on in the securities industry than in any
other specifically subject to regulation by federal agencies." Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244 (1963).
Much has been written concerning the role of self-regulation in the securities industry. See, e.g.,
Asch, supra note 8; Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private CartelGoes Public, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 675 (1970); Cary, supra note 8; Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 663 (1964); Mazo, Antitrust
Courts Versus the SEC: A FunctionalAllocation of Decisionmaking Roles, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63
(1974); Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets. A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 883 (1981); Pozen, Competition and Regulation in the Stock Markets, 73
MICH. L. REV. 317 (1974); Ratner, Regulation of the Compensation of Securities Dealers, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 348 (1970); Smythe, supra note 5; Comment, supra note 33.
35. The rationale of securities regulation "is rooted in two separate conditions: the extreme vulnerability
of the investing public, and the significance of industry performance for the national economy." Asch,
supra note 8, at 210.
Justice Douglas, while Chairman of the SEC, stated the intention of the scheme as one of "letting
the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep
the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope
it would never have to be used." W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940).
36. Because the courts will imply an immunity from the antitrust laws only when necessary to further the
policies and objectives of the Securities Exchange Act, the objectives of both Acts are almost always
served.
37. Not all the objectives of the Securities Exchange Act require anticompetitive exchange rules. Furthermore, not all of the anticompetitive exchange rules are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
38. For an example of an anticompetitive exchange rule which the Supreme Court found to be impliedly
immune from the antitrust laws, see Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., infra notes 60 to 69 and
accompanying text.
39. Congress established a regulatory scheme that permits some anticompetitiveness, because in certain
instances competing policy interests, such as greater stability in financial markets, supersede the general procompetitive objectives of the antitrust laws. Congress did not intend to see the regulatory
scheme yield for the sake of competition alone. Where an anticompetitive rule is necessary to ensure
stability in the securities industry, the antitrust law should yield.
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Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.4 The petitioner, a nonmember broker-dealer,
had contracted with ten members of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for
direct private wire connections with their offices. 4 ' Although the NYSE approved
the wire connections on a temporary basis, it later ordered, without a hearing, that
the NYSE members disconnect the connections.4 2 The petitioner alleged that the
NYSE order violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.43
Although the Supreme Court ultimately found that the NYSE's order violated
the Sherman Act, 44 it recognized the need to reconcile the two schemes so as not
to frustrate wholly either one.4 5 In Silver the Supreme Court stated the guiding
principle as to whether or not an implied immunity should be found: "Repeal [of
the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as implied only to the extent necessary to
to the minimum
make the Securities
' 46 Exchange Act work, and even then only
extent necessary.

Guided by this principle, the Court applied its test for deciding implied immunity issues. First, the Court examined potential direct statutory conflict between
the Securities Exchange Act and the antitrust laws for authority of an immunity
for the challenged NYSE action,4 7 and found no such conflict.4" Second, the
Supreme Court analyzed whether an incompatibility between the policy objectives
of exchange self-regulation with SEC review and the objectives of the antitrust
laws warranted restricting the range of the antitrust laws.49 The Court found that
the SEC regulatory scheme and the application of the antitrust laws to the challenged NYSE action were compatible5 ° and consequently applied the antitrust
laws to the challenged NYSE action. 5' Third, the Court assessed whether the
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.

51.

373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Id. at 343.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345. More specifically, the petitioner alleged that the NYSE conspired to restrain petitioners
from using the private wire connections and ticker service. Id.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 357. "The proper approach to this case, in our view, is an analysis which reconciles the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted." Id.
After acknowledging that Congress did not provide an express antitrust exemption for securities
exchanges, the Silver Court stated that "it is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favored." Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
"Although the Act gives to the Securities and Exchange Commission the power to request exchanges
to make changes in their rules . . . and implicitly, therefore, to disapprove any rules adopted by an
does not give the Commission jurisdiction to review particular instances of enforceexchange . . .it
ment of exchange rules." Id. at 357 (citations omitted). "Moreover, the Commission's lack of jurisdiction over particular applications of exchange rules means that the question of antitrust exemption does
not involve any problem of conflict or coextensiveness of coverage with the agency's regulatory
power." Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 358. "The issue is only that of the extent to which the character and objectives of the duty of
exchange self-regulation contemplated by the Securities Exchange Act are incompatible with the
maintenance of an antitrust action." Id.
There is nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs the antitrust function of insuring that an exchange will not in some cases apply its rules so as to do injury to competition
which cannot be justified as furthering self-regulative ends. . . . Such unjustified self-regulatory
activity can only diminish public respect for and confidence in the integrity and efficacy of the
exchange mechanism [those goals which the Court espoused as the purposes and objectives of
SEC review of stock exchange self-regulation]. Some form of review of exchange self-policing,
whether by administrative agencies or by the courts, is therefore not at all incompatible with the
fulfillment of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act.
Id. at 358-59. The Silver Court further stated that "[d]enial of [the antitrust laws'] applicability would
defeat the Congressional policy without serving the policy of the Securities Exchange Act." Id. at 360.
Id. at 361.
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NYSE action was legal even though it fell within the scope of the antitrust laws.5 2
Finding no justification, the Court held that the NYSE's order to disconnect the
wire connections violated the antitrust laws. The Court stated, however, that if
the SEC had had direct review of NYSE orders, it might have reached a different
decision." 3

Lower federal courts have interpreted the Silver decision in many ways and
have held different aspects of its analysis to be dispositive of the question of implied antitrust immunity.54 One lower federal court, for instance, held that
whether an opportunity for a hearing and adequate notice were provided to those
parties adversely affected by the challenged exchange rule was dispositive of
whether an implied repeal existed. 55 Many lower courts have reasoned that an
implied immunity is justified because the exchange rule or action is subject to SEC
review.5 6 In Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange,57 however, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly rejected this view and stated that the
potential of SEC review does not alone warrant an immunity from antitrust
52.
53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

Id. In finding no justification for NYSE's actions, the Court stressed the lack of adequate hearing and
notice requirements in the SEC's review of securities exchange actions. Id.
Were there Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for scrutiny of a particular
exchange ruling, as there is under the 1938 Maloney Act amendments to the Exchange Act to
examine disciplinary action by a registered securities association. . . a different case would arise
concerning exemption from the operation of laws designed to prevent anticompetitive activity,
an issue we do not decide today.
Id. at 358 n. 12. "Should review of exchange self-regulation be provided through a vehicle other than
the antitrust laws, a different case as to antitrust exemption would be presented." Id. at 360. The
Court further stated:
Given the principle that exchange self-regulation is to be regarded as justified in response to
antitrust charges only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the
Securities Exchange Act, it is clear that no justification can be offered for self-regulation conducted without provision for some method of telling a protesting nonmember why a rule is
being invoked so as to harm him and allowing him to reply in explanation of his position. No
policy reflected in the Securities Exchange Act is, to begin with, served by denial of notice and
an opportunity for hearing. Indeed, the aims of the statutory scheme of self-policing-to protect investors and promote fair dealing-are defeated when an exchange exercises its tremendous economic power, without explaining its basis for acting, for the absence of an obligation to
give some form of notice and, if timely requested, a hearing creates a great danger of perpetration of injury that will damage public confidence in the exchange. The requirement of such a
hearing will, by contrast, help in effectuating antitrust policies by discouraging anticompetitive
applications of exchange rules which are not justifiable as within the scope of the purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act.
Id. at 361-62.
See, e.g., Schaeffer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'g 326 F.
Supp. 1186 (N.D.Ill. 1970), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Thill Securities v. New York Stock
Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Abbott Securities Corp., 384 F.
Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1974); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 366 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
afl'd, 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cit. 1974), affid, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54
F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S.
156 (1974); Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.III. 1966), affd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967).
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005
(2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The decision was based upon the Silver Court's language
that the exchange action may have been justified irrespective of the fact that the antitrust laws were to
be applied. See supra note 53. One commentator asserted the analysis of the procedure issue was
incorrect because the Court took too narrow of an implied repeal approach and thus added this "justification" question to the legal issue of whether an implied repeal is necessary. Linden, A Reconciliation ofAntitrust Law With Securities Regulation: The JudicialApproach, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 179,
195 (1977).
Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), affg 326 F. Supp. 1186
(N.D. 111.1970), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Abbott Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exch.,
384 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1974); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 366 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), affid, 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F.
Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), affd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967).
433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
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laws.5 8 Before it would impliedly repeal the antitrust laws, the Seventh Circuit
required a showing that the application of antitrust laws to the challenged exchange rule or action would frustrate the purposes of the Securities Exchange
Act. 9
In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,6" the United States Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the confusion surrounding Silver v. New York Stock Exchange. In Gordon, the petitioner had alleged that the New York and the American Stock Exchanges' rules requiring members to charge fixed commission rates
for transactions under $500,000 violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.6"
The Supreme Court held that this rule was immune from the antitrust laws. 62
The Court relied on three factors. First, the Court examined the long history of
commission rate self-regulation by securities exchanges 63 and noted that Congress
provided for SEC review over exchange commission rates in the Securities Exchange Act. 64 Second, it concluded that the SEC's comprehensive exercise of its
supervisory authority over exchange commission rates supported a holding in
favor of an implied repeal of the Sherman Act. 65 Third, the Court noted that the
1975 Amendments 6 6 to the Securities Exchange Act still provided for SEC review
of commission rates, despite abolishing fixed commission rates, indicating Congressional approval of exclusive SEC review and oversight of exchange commisConsequently, the Court held that where the SEC actively and
sion rates.
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.

66.
67.

Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 269-70. In Thill, the plaintiff, a nonmember broker-dealer, alleged that the NYSE's rule which
prohibited members from giving nonmember dealers rebates for orders placed violated both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Plaintiff asserted that such a rule constituted an unreasonable and unlawful
combination and conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce as well as an unreasonable manipulation of the securities market.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the NYSE's argument that an implied repeal of the
antitrust laws existed because the rule was subject to potential SEC review. Contrary to its earlier
holding in Kaplan, the court held that the presence of an SEC review mechanism does not make repeal
of the antitrust laws necessary:
In our view, Silver teaches that a reconcilation of the two statutory schemes is not foreclosed
simply because the Securities Act and the review jurisdiction of the SEC may touch upon the
activity challenged under the antitrust laws . . . . [The] general power to adopt rules relating
to the relations of its members with non-members, however, does not in and of itself place the
application of such rules outside the reach of antitrust laws. . . . In short, its exemption must
be based on a showing of true necessity.
Id. at 269. Faced with this case again, the court of appeals found that an implied repeal of the antitrust laws was necessary in light of Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., infra note 60. Thill Securities
Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 633 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1980), a'g 473 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1980).
422 U.S. 659 (1975).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 663-66.
Id. at 666-667. Section 19(b) provided that the SEC had the power to order the exchanges to "alter or
supplement" their rules concerning "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission" if it finds that "such
changes are necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securi" 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1970). This provision has since been
ties traded in upon such exchange ..
amended. Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
422 U.S. at 682-91. The Court engaged itself in a lengthy discussion of SEC review and supervision of
fixed commission rates. It emphasized the various SEC studies concerning commission rates and the
SEC's adoption of rule 19b-3, which provided for the graduated abolition of fixed commission rates in
the exchanges. Id. at 668-679.
According to the Court, a Senate subcommittee which studied commission rates shared its view
that the SEC was actively supervising the exchanges as to commission rates. After lengthy study, the
Senate Subcommittee on Securities concluded that competitive rates must be introduced at all transaction levels and that legislation was not required at that time in view of the progress made by the SEC.
Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-80b (1975).
The Court interpreted this legislation as a Congressional affirmation of SEC review of such rates:
Significantly, in the new legislation enacted subsequent to the SEC's abolition of Commission
rate fixing, the Congress has indicated its continued approval of the commission rate structure.
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directly reviews an exchange rule or disciplinary action, the courts should imply
an immunity from the antitrust laws for that particular rule or action.6" The
Court distinguished Gordon from Silver because, in Gordon, unlike Silver, the SEC
had the power to and actually did directly oversee the challenged action.6 9
In United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers,7 ° the Supreme

Court went one step further than Gordon and found antitrust immunity where the
SEC could, but did not, actively review the rules of the association. In NASD, the
SEC 7 brought an action against the association, mutual funds, mutual-fund underwriters and broker-dealers, alleging that these defendants "combined and
agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices of mutual-fund shares in secondary market transactions between dealers, from an investor to a dealer, and between investors through brokered transactions."7 2 The government alleged that
such horizontal and vertical restrictions in the secondary market violated section
1 of the Sherman Act.73
74
In finding the challenged NASD practices immune from the antitrust laws,
the Court discussed the purposes of both the Investment Company Act 75 and the
NASD restrictions on the sale of mutual-fund shares in the secondary market. It
found that section 22 of the Investment Company Act was implemented to curtail
the "two-price system ' ' 76 as well as to eliminate the "bootleg market, ' 7 7 both of
Although legislatively enacting the SEC regulatory provision banning fixed rates, Congress has

68.

69.

70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.

77.

explicitly provided that the SEC, under certain circumstances and upon the making of specified
findings, may allow reintroduction of fixed rates.
422 U.S. at 690-91.
Id. at 691. Since the Court found the need for an implied antitrust repeal, it did not reach the issue of
whether the rule was nonetheless justified.
Many of the lower courts since Gordon have readily found an implied repeal of the antitrust laws
for securities exchange rules. Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 633 F.2d 65 (7th Cir.
1980), affg 473 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Wis. 1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); Harding v. American Stock Exch., 527 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1976); Sloan v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 535 F.2d 676
(2d Cir. 1976); Shumate & Co. v. New York Stock Exch., 486 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Abbott
Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 1976-2 Trade Cos. (CCH) 61,017 (D.D.C. 1976). Contra
Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1053 (1976).
Hence, [in Silver] the regulatory agency could not
prevent application of the rules that would have undesirable anticompetitive effects; there was
no governmental oversight of the exchange's self-regulatory action, and no method of insuring
that some attention at least was given to the public interest in competition. . . . In contrast to
the circumstance of Silver, § 19(b) gave the SEC direct regulatory power over exchange rules
and practices with respect to "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission."
422 U.S. at 684-85. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
422 U.S. 694 (1975).
At the district court level, the government's action was accompanied by a private action alleging
similar antitrust violations. The private complaint was dismissed after the Supreme Court's decision
in NASD. Haddad v. Crosby Corp., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,503 (D.D.C. 1977).
422 U.S. at 700.
The government's first count alleged a "horizontal combination and conspiracy among the members of
appellee NASD to prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market in the purchase and sale of mutual
fund shares." 422 U.S. at 701-02. Seven other counts alleged various vertical restrictions on the
secondary market for mutual fund shares. Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 729-30, 735.
Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-64 (1982)).
The two-price system was the method used to price the daily net asset value of the mutual fund shares.
The price of the fund shares for a given day was set at the close of trading on the preceding day. Of
this two-price system, the Court said:
During [the period between the close of one day and the beginning of trading the next day] two
prices were known: the present day's trading price based on the portfolio value established the
previous day; and the following day's price, which was based on the net asset value computed
at the close of the exchange trading on the present day. One aware of both prices could engage
in "riskless trading" during this interim period .... The two-price system did not benefit the
investing public generally.
422 U.S. at 707 (1975).
A bootleg system occurred where broker-dealers having no connection with the mutual fund would
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which were considered abuses produced by an overly unrestricted secondary
market.
The Supreme Court discussed extensively the legislative intent and history of
sections 22(d)7 8 and 22(f) 7 9 of the Investment Company Act. The Court found

that although section 22(d) warranted no repeal of the Sherman Act,80 the provisions in section 22(f) did warrant an implied repeal of the Sherman Act for the
alleged vertical restrictions. 8 After finding that an implied antitrust repeal was
supported by both the legislative history of section 22(f) of the Investment Company Act 82 and the views expressed by the SEC on this section after passage of
the Act,8 3 the Court concluded that the provisions of section 22(f) and application
of the antitrust laws could not be reconciled.84
After determining that the SEC's supervisory authority under section 22(f)
warranted an implied antitrust repeal for the vertical restrictions, the Court addressed the issue of whether the SEC regulatory scheme over the NASD provided
by the Maloney Act8 5 was so pervasive as to justify an implied repeal for the
horizontal restrictions.8 6 The Court concluded that "the investiture of such pervasive supervisory authority in the SEC suggests that Congress intended to lift the
ban of the Sherman Act from association activities approved by the SEC."'8' The

78.

79.

80.

81.
82.
83.

84.

85.
86.
87.

purchase shares from selling shareholders either at a price slightly greater than the redemption price
or at a discount from contract dealers. They would then sell the shares at a price slightly lower than
the price of shares in the primary system. This caused a price war between those selling shares in the
primary market and those selling in the secondary market. Id. at 709.
Section 22(d) provides in pertinent part:
No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued by it to any
person except either to or through a principal underwriter for distribution or at a current
public offering price described in the prospectus, and, if such class of security is being currently
offered in the public by or through an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security,
and no dealer shall sell any such security to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter,
or the issuer, except at a current public offering price described in the prospectus.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1982).
Section 22(f) provides:
No registered open end company shall restrict the transferability or negotiability of any
security of which it is the issuer except in conformity with the statements with respect thereto
contained in its registration statement nor in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe in the interests of the holders of all of the outstanding securities of
such investment company.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22() (1982).
422 U.S. at 720. The Court found that § 22(d) did not apply to "brokered transactions" but rather
only applied when broker-dealers were acting in their capacities as dealers. Id. at 713-43. The Court's
view of the provision was the same held by the SEC General Counsel in 1941 when he said that
§ 22(d) did not place restrictions on brokerage transactions. Id. at 717.
Id. at 720-29. The Court found that the congressional purpose of § 22(f) was to allow mutual funds to
place transferability restrictions on their shares, unless otherwise disallowed by other SEC rules or
regulations. These are the types of restrictions alleged to have violated the Sherman Act.
Id. at 721-24.
Id. at 725-27. The Court rejected the government's argument that insufficient exercise of the SEC's
regulatory authority over restrictions on the transferability of mutual fund shares does not constitute
review sufficient to warrant implied repeal. The Court stated that the SEC's power to review need
only be invoked if a mutual fund places restrictions which are inconsistent with SEC rules or regulations. Thus, the restrictions are subject to SEC disapproval, not approval. Id. at 726.
Id. at 729. The Court recognized that the challenged restrictions, absent regulatory authority, would
constitute per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. "[H]owever, Congress has made a judgment
that these restrictions on competition might be necessitated by the unique problems of the mutual fund
industry, and has vested in the SEC final authority to determine whether and to what extent they
should be tolerated ...." Id. at 729.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 733. The Court reached this conclusion by finding that "the SEC, in its exercise of authority
over association rules and practices, is charged with protection of the public interest as well as the
interests of shareholders . . . and it repeatedly has indicated that it weighs competitive concerns in the
exercise of its continued supervisory responsibility." Id.
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Court stated that the "maintenance of an antitrust action for activities so directly
related to the SEC's responsibilities poses a substantial danger that appellees
would be subjected to duplicative and inconsistent standards. This is hardly a
result that Congress would have mandated.""8 Moreover, the Court held that
where the Act expressly authorizes anticompetitive conduct, the authorized conduct is immune from antitrust scrutiny. 9
Thus, the courts will imply an antitrust immunity where the SEC has direct
oversight of the exchange rule or action and where the rule is necessary to make
the Securities Exchange Act effective or where Congress has expressly endorsed
the subsequent anticompetitive practice. In light of NASD, it appears that the
direct agency oversight need not be actively exercised, as was required by the
Supreme Court in Gordon. Also, it is unclear to what extent the courts will apply
the "pervasive regulatory scheme" language of NASD to future securities exchange cases.
THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
When Congress amended the Commodity Exchange Act by enacting the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,90 it substantially altered the
nature and extent of federal agency regulation of the commodity exchanges. Prior
to the Act, the Commodity Exchange Authority had little oversight powers and
narrow jurisdiction.9" The 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act,
however, created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 92 and gave the
CFTC direct oversight of commodity exchange rules and actions. In the Futures
Trading Act of 1982, 9 Congress confirmed the CFTC's authority over the commodity exchanges by reauthorizing that Commission until September 30, 198694
and by altering its direct oversight of exchanges only slightly.95
Like the Securities Exchange Act, 96 the CFTC Act has a two-tiered regulatory
scheme. On the first tier, the commodity exchanges regulate themselves. 97 On the
second tier, the CFTC oversees exchange self-regulation in order to advance the
Act's objectives 9" and avoid abuses by the exchanges or their members.9 9
Courts considering whether to imply immunity typically emphasize Congressional intent to displace antitrust laws in order to further the objectives of the
regulatory schemes. " Because the courts emphasize both the nature of agency
regulation and legislative intent, it is appropriate to review the nature of CFTC
Id. at 732. The Court actually found that the pervasive regulatory scheme provided in the Maloney
Act warranted an implied repeal of the antitrust laws for both the horizontal and vertical restrictions.
Id. at 733-34.
89. Id. at 711. Id. at 736 (White, J., dissenting).
90. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
91. The Commodity Exchange Authority had very little authority over the exchanges, especially since it
had little power over futures trading, which had grown substantially prior to the enactment of the
CFTC Act.
92. 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1982)).
93. Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983).
94. 96 Stat. 2294 (1983). See also H.R. Rep. No. 97-565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 3871, 3875.
95. Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983).
96. See infra notes 111 to 125 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
98. Under the CFTC Act, the CFTC must oversee, approve or disapprove exchange rules and regulations
to ensure that they do not conflict with the objectives (e.g. preventing manipulation, or excessive
speculation by exchange members) of the Act. See infra notes 102 to 110 and accompanying text.
99. In the Commodity Exchange Act, Congress recognized the volatile nature of the commodity futures
industry and the great potential for manipulative, speculative, and detrimental transactions in the
commodity futures industry. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
100. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
88.
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oversight of the commodity exchanges and the legislative history of the CFTC Act
regarding the application of the antitrust laws.
Nature of CFTC and SEC Regulation of Exchanges
Under the present regulatory scheme, the CFTC directly oversees most commodity exchange rules, regulations and disciplinary actions. Just as the SEC oversees securities exchanges, t' the CFTC must affirmatively approve or disapprove
10 2
rules, regulations, bylaws and resolutions adopted by a commodity exchange.
If the CFTC disapproves an exchange rule, it can order the exchange to alter or
supplement the rule. 103 Furthermore, if the Commission determines that an exchange has failed to sufficiently alter or supplement the disapproved rule, it can
alter or supplement the rule on its own accord."° The CFTC also has the power

to reverse, modify or remand commodity exchange disciplinary actions and membership decisions. 105 If an exchange fails to take disciplinary action against one or
more of its members, the Commission itself has the authority to intervene and
take appropriate action.'0 6
Under the CFTC Act, each commodity exchange must enforce all bylaws,
rules, regulations, and resolutions which the CFTC has approved. 10 7 The exchanges must revoke and refuse to enforce any bylaw, rule, regulation or resolution disapproved by the Commission.' 0 8 A commodity exchange's failure to
comply with the the Act or with CFTC rules or regulations is cause for suspension or revocation of that exchange's designation as a "contract market."' 0 9 The
Act makes the trading of futures unlawful except when traded in a "contract market" as defined by the Act." 0 The CFTC, therefore, has substantial, direct supervisory authority over commodity exchange rules and actions.
The SEC has substantial authority to oversee the rules,"' proposed rules and
rule changes, 1 2 and disciplinary actions13 of the securities exchanges. Before
granting registration to an exchange, the SEC must review the registrant ex101. See infra notes Ill to 125 and accompanying text.
102. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(12) (1982). This provision also requires the CFTC to publish notice and afford interested persons an opportunity to present their views prior to CFTC approval or disapproval of the
exchange rule or action. Id. The CFTC may approve of rule changes or additions to rules of a registered futures association. However, if the association requests review of the rule change or rule addition or the CFIC notifies the association of its intention to review the changes or additions, it becomes
effective 10 days after submission. Otherwise, the CFTC must approve or disapprove such rules
within 180 days of receipt, or else the rules become effective after that time. 7 U.S.C. § 210)(1982).
103. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7) (1982). The CFTC may request a registered futures association to alter or supplement certain association rules. 7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(2)(1982).
104. Id. With respect to registered futures associations, the CFTC may alter or supplement rules regarding
membership, methods for rule changes or additions, and methods for choosing officers and directors, if
the association has failed to do so within a reasonable time after the CFTC has requested such action.
7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(2) (1982).
Also, the CFTC may, if necessary and appropriate to assure fair dealing by association members
and after notice and opportunity for a hearing, abrogate any association rule. 7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(1)
(1982).
105. 7 U.S.C. § 12c (1982). The CFTC has similar powers with regard to disciplinary actions of a registered futures association. 7 U.S.C. §§ 21(i) (1982).
106. Id.
107. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (1982). A registered futures association must also enforce compliance with its rules.
7 U.S.C. § 21(1) (1982).
108. Id.
109. 7 U.S.C. § 7b (1982). The CFTC has similar power over registered futures associations. 7 U.S.C.
§ 21(1) (1982).
110. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b),(c) (1982).
112. Id.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (1982).
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change's rules to ensure that the rules conform to the provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act." 4 The SEC's review authority also allows it to approve or disapprove of any exchange's proposed rule or rule change." 5 If an aggrieved party
files for review of an exchange disciplinary sanction imposed against one or more
of its members, the SEC may review the disciplinary sanction.16 Furthermore,
under certain circumstances the SEC can amend or abrogate the rules of an exchange."t 7 The SEC may suspend or revoke the registration of a securities ex9
change s or censure or impose limitations
20 upon its activities" if it determines
such action is necessary or appropriate.1
Although the SEC has substantial supervisory authority, the Securities Exchange Act requires procedural fairness in the review of exchange rules and disciplinary actions. 2 1 When reviewing, amending or abrogating proposed rules or
proposed rule amendments, the SEC must provide adequate notice of its intentions122 and must afford interested persons an opportunity to present their views
on the proposed SEC action. 123 Moreover, the SEC must use a formal order 24 to
approve or disapprove a proposed exchange rule or rule change.125
Legislative History of the CFrC Act
The legislative history of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
also supports extension of the Silver,' 26 Gordon,127 and NASD 28 holdings to the
commodity exchanges. Section 15 of the Act provides:
The Commission shall take into consideration the public interest to be protected by the antitrust laws and endeavor to take the least anticompetitive
means of achieving the objectives of this chapter, as well as the policies and
purposes of this chapter, in issuing any order or adopting any Commission
rule or regulation of a contract market or 129
registered futures association established pursuant to section 21 of this title.

114. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(1982). When reviewing an application for registration, the SEC must publish notice
and afford interested persons an opportunity to present their views. Id.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1982), This subsection provides that "no proposed rule change shall take effect
unless approved by the Commission or otherwise permitted in accordance with the provision of this
subsection." Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (1982).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982). This section provides in part:
The Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from (hereinafter in this subsection collectively referred to as "amend") the rules of a self-regulatory organization (other than
a registered clearing agency) as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the
fair administration of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to requirements of
this chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such organization, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. ...
Id.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (1982).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b),(d) (1982).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(a)-(c) (1982). Prior to the 1975 Amendments, the Securities Exchange Act did not
provide for notice and hearing. The Supreme Court in Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341
(1963), cited the lack of appropriate procedures as one reason why the challenged NYSE disciplinary
action was not immune from the antitrust laws. See supra note 31.
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(a)-(c) (1982). 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e) (1982) provides an aggrieved party with an opportunity for a hearing regarding an exchange's final disciplinary sanction.
124. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(a)(l),(b),(e)(1), (f),(h) (1982).
125. Id. These subsections provide for the promulgation of a formal order within various specified time
periods.
126. Supra note 25.
127. Supra note 60.
128. Supra note 70.
129. 7 U.S.C. § 19 (1982).
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The original version of the House bill 11955,30 included an express exemption
from the antitrust laws for any commodity exchange rule that the CFTC required
or specifically approved under the Act.13' Relying upon the Justice Department's
statement that the commodity exchanges enjoyed an implied antitrust immunity
under Silver,' 32 the House Committee on Agriculture deleted the express
exemption. t33
Although the express exemption provision was deleted, the final bill included
section 15, which requires the CFTC to "endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means of achieving the objectives and policies of the CFTC Act."' 134 When
130. H.R. 11955, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. § 106 (1974).
131. This section provided:
Sec. 17 (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a contract market, registered futures
association established pursuant to Section 15 of this Act, or person registered under the provisions of this Act who is acting pursuant to and in accordance with any order, rule, or regulation of the Commission or any bylaw, rule, or regulation of a contract market which has been
required or specifically approved by the Commission as provided in this Act, shall be exempt
from the antitrust laws of the United States as defined in Section 12 of Title 15 of the United
States Code, and amendments and Acts supplementary thereto.
(b) The Commission shall take into consideration the public interest to be protected by
the antitrust laws as well as the policies and purposes of this Act in issuing any order or adopting any rule regulation, or in requiring or approving any bylaw, rule or regulation of a contract
market or registered futures association established pursuant to Section 15 of this Act.
Id. See Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 347-48
(1974).
132. The Department of Justice did not endorse this express exemption provision because it asserted that
"this exemption is unwise from the standpoint of public policy and unnecessary because present law
provides an adequate antitrust exemption for those activities of contract markets necessary to achieve
valid objectives of the Commodity Exchange Act." House Report, supra note 5, at 23-24.
The Department of Justice letter further stated:
Under existing law, activities of regulated exchanges approved, as distinguished from mandated, by a regulatory agency, are also exempt from the antitrust laws if they are "necessary to
make the . . . [regulatory act] work" and no more restrictive than necessary. Thus existing
law assures the exchanges that, where there is a conflict between the antitrust laws and the
Commodity Exchange Act, the latter is paramount, but, where there is no conflict, the antitrust
laws are fully applicable. . . . The 'necessity' test of Silver applies where the regulatory agency
reviews the rules of a self-regulatory organization. . . . and it also applies to commodity as
well as securities exchanges.
Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted). In the report the Committee cited this opinion as their basis for
eliminating the express antitrust exemption. Id. at 27-28.
133. House Report, supra note 5, at 28.
134. 7 U.S.C. § 19 (1982). The original version of this provision required only that the CFTC consider the
public interest behind the antitrust laws in approving commodity exchange rules. See supra note 131.
It has been argued that the courts should not be able to apply the antitrust laws where the CFTC
has met its section 15 duty. Special Committee on Commodities Regulation, supra note 29.
Where the Commission has considered the antitrust issues and endeavored to take the least
anticompetitive means in achieving the objectives of the Act, a court should not be able, on
antitrust grounds, to overturn its decision. Of course, if in taking its action, the Commission
has acted arbitrarily or capriciously or has abused its discretion, a court may, on those grounds,
overturn the Commission's determination in an appropriate proceeding.
Id. at 254.
A leading commentator believes that "it is extremely doubtful that the CFTC's compliance with
section 15 could be challenged by an original civil antitrust suit against the exchange, since the actionable wrong results from the CFTC's breach of its section 15 duty." Johnson, supra note 12, at 126-27.
See also 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 418-21.
Section 15 has been appropriately viewed as more or less a codification of the rule of reason part of
the test established in Silver. Johnson, supra note 12, at 123. See supra note 52 and accompanying
text.
The few lower courts that have addressed the effect of § 15 on the CFTC's rule approval process,
however, have not required the CFTC to implement the least anticompetitive means to further the
objecives of the Act. For example, in Rosenthal v. Bagley, 450 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. I11.1978), the
plaintiff challenged enforcement of a regulation approved by the CFTC on the basis that the CFTC
breached its duty under § 15 to "endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means." The court rejected this argument, saying that the CFTC fully meets its duty under § 15 when it fully considers the
antitrust ramifications of a ruling it makes. "The CFTC more than fulfilled its responsibility to con-
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amending this section to its final form, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry stated that "[i]t did not want to make the antitrust laws more restrictive
in the commodities industry than in the securities industry."'' 35 This statement
illustrates the legislative intent to provide for uniformity in the approaches to be
taken by the courts136
in applying the antitrust laws to securities exchanges and commodity exchanges.
The legislative history of section 15 demonstrates that Congress sought to effectuate two goals through this provision. First, Congress wanted the CFTC to
weigh the antitrust laws' procompetitive objectives as a factor in approving or
disapproving commodity exchange rules and actions. Second, Congress intended
the courts to apply an implied antitrust immunity to commodity exchange rules
and actions which the CFTC actively and directly oversees, those which are expressly required, and those which are necessary to effectuate the objectives of the
Commodity Exchange Act.
CONCLUSION

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission possesses extensive supervisory authority over the commodity exchanges so as to ensure that they regulate
their members effectively and fairly. Congress implemented a two-tiered regulatory scheme in order to provide the utmost stability in an otherwise potentially
volatile industry. This increased stability, however, results in a regulated industry
possessing certain inherently anticompetive characteristics.
Complete application of the antitrust laws in a commodities industry for exchange rules and actions would contravene some of the objectives Congress
sought to achieve in the Commodity Exchange Act. 137 Since Congress failed to
provide an express antitrust exemption, a judicially-implied immunity is necessary
to prevent the frustration of CFTC regulation where it actively and directly supervises exchange rules and actions, or where the Act expressly endorses anticompe-

titive practices. The courts have implied such an immunity for the securities
industry, although they generally disfavor an implied repeal of the antitrust
laws. 138

135.
136.

137.

138.

sider the antitrust laws. Plaintiffs' assertion that the Commission was bound to adopt the least anticompetitive means is without merit." Id. at 1124-25. See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm. v.
American Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
S. Rep. No. 1131, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5863.
Although both Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) and United States National
Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975) were both decided after enactment of the CFTC Act,
the courts should apply to commodity exchanges the approach taken by the Court in these cases to
implement the intent of Congress.
The commodity futures industry is a potentially volatile industry; without regulation of exchanges and
their members, the possibility of manipulative and speculative practices would be greatly increased.
The rules restricting exchange membership, for example, help prevent the use of such practices. If the
courts applied the antitrust laws to all exchange rules and regulations, the exchange's ability to increase stability in this volatile industry would be lost. Although allowing free competition in the
commodities industry might foster greater activity in the market, the potential for greater activity is
outweighed by the abusive manipulative and speculative practices which would most likely result from
the complete application of antitrust laws to commodity exchange rules and actions.
Congress has recognized the possibility of great abuses in a commodities industry without
regulation:
The transactions and prices of commodities on such boards of trade are susceptible to excessive
speculation and can be manipulated, controlled, cornered or squeezed, to the detriment of the
producer or the consumer and the persons handling commodities and the products and byproducts thereof in interstate commerce, rendering regulation imperative for the protection of such
commerce and the national public interest therein.
7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
357 (1963).
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The legislative history of the CFTC Act supports the conclusion that the
courts should imply an antitrust immunity for commodity exchange rules and
actions. Moreover, the similarities in the nature of federal agency review in the
securities and commodities industry, and the rationale for self-regulation and the
anticompetitive nature of the schemes support an implied antitrust immunity for
the commodities industry. For these reasons, the courts should, and probably
will, apply to commodity exchanges the implied antitrust immunity approach that
the Supreme Court established in Silver, Gordon, and NASD.
Michael J. Allen*
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